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THE UNSEAWORTHY INSTANT
HILER B. ZOBEL*
Now, laymen, when they think of a vessel being seaworthy or un-
seaworthy, probably ask themselves, "Has this vessel a hole in the
hold-?"'
THE MITCHELL CASE: SEAWORTHINESS DEFINED
Seaworthiness and its opposite are indeed terms whose application
in the courts differs markedly from their use in ordinary life. In order
to be seaworthy, the vessel and her appurtenances, which include
"things about a ship, whether the hull, the decks, the machinery, the
tools furnished, the stowage, or the cargo containers, ' 2 must be "rea-
sonably fit for their intended use."3 Thus a vessel which is, in every
practical sense, soundly equipped and ready for sea will be legally un-
seaworthy if the trier of fact concludes that the tiny spot of grease upon
which a seaman slipped rendered the ladder on which the grease lay
not reasonably safe.4 The Supreme Court, in Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, Inc.,5 the case which defined seaworthiness, recognized that ac-
cidents may occur even under conditions of reasonable safety. "The
standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will
weather every conceivable storm or withstand every imaginable peril
of the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended service."
The lower courts have generally interpreted this language to mean that
the mere occurrence of a shipboard accident, without more, does not
constitute unseaworthiness. 7
In fact, however, the Supreme Court language just quoted does
not direct itself toward "reasonable safety." The Court is indeed dis-
cussing seaworthiness in the lay sense, i.e., a vessel "reasonably fit" for
navigation. The opinion explicitly denies any attempt "to suggest that
the owner is obligated to furnish an accident-free ship."8
The questions which Mitchell left unanswered, and with which
0 Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B., Harvard College, 1953; LL.B.,
Harvard Law School, 1959. The author wishes to thank Seth H. Emmer, Class of 1971,
Boston College Law School, for research assistance in the preparation of this article.
I Logan v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 353 F.2d 373, 377 (1st Cir. 1965)
(Wyzanski, J., charging jury) (emphasis added).
2 Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 213 (1963).
3 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
4 See Calderola v. Cunard S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1960).
5 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
Sid. at 550.
7 See, e.g., Belships Co. v. Bilbao, 390 F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir. 1968).
8 362 U.S. at 550.
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this paper will concern itself are these: If the injury-causing circum-
stance comes into existence simultaneously with or momentarily before
the injury itself, is the vessel less than reasonably safe and hence unsea-
worthy? Is the vessel less than reasonably safe and therefore unseawor-
thy if the injury is caused by "appurtenances reasonably fit for their
intended use" 9 but used in a negligent manner?
The answers to these questions, it is submitted, do not result from
a glib divorcing of "liability from concepts of negligence."' 0 Such a
formula presumably eliminates, first, the foreseeability aspect of liabil-
ity (i.e., the need for the shipowner's knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the grease on the ladder). It also seems to render immaterial any in-
quiry into whether the accident resulted from careless use of safe
equipment. Thus, taken literally, the logical result of Mitchell's "abso-
lute duty" standard is that, as to the plaintiff, the inquiry ends if the
place where he was working was, at the moment of his injury, not rea-
sonably safe. This logic, however, conflicts squarely with Mitchell's ex-
plicit refusal to require "an accident-free ship." It raises further prob-
lems arising from Mitchell's implicit promise that if the vessel is "rea-
sonably safe," the shipowner will be exonerated. The Mitchell Court,
one suspects, was trying to express a formula which would permanently
eliminate squabbles which had been developing in the lower court
opinions over the precise amount of time which was required to elapse
between birth of an injury-producing circumstance and the injury it-
self.1
Further, assembling the 5-4 majority vote appeared also to require
some assurance that reasonableness of safety was all the Court would
demand. Because, as has been suggested above and hopefully will be
illustrated below, it is difficult if not impossible to conceive of a rea-
sonably safe accident, the Court's illustration of its principle in terms
not of personal injury but of navigability seems to be, if not a deliber-
ate recognition of the conceptual difficulty, certainly an apt, albeit un-
conscious, way of highlighting it. The fictive nature of "unseaworthi-
ness" in the typical shipboard accident situation may well have caused
the Court's approach to vagueness.
THE MEANIG OF MITCHELL IN THE LOWER COURTS
Factually and legally, Mitchell did not involve faulty equipment.
The issue was: Does it make any difference, for purposes of testing
9 Id.
10 d.
11 See cases cited in the Mitchell opinion, 362 U.S. at 542.
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seaworthiness, how long prior to the accident the offending condition
- here fish gurry and slime on a trawler's rail - had existed? Because
the opinion was immediately regarded as the Supreme Court's final
disposition of the time-lapse question and the split it had engendered
among the circuits, Mitchell was initially treated, in the lower courts
at least, as imposing an absolute requirement of perpetual, albeit rea-
sonable, safety. Thus, in Grzybowski v. Arrow Barge Co., 12 the plaintiff
had injured himself on pine jelly soap which the longshoremen had
used as a lubricant while shifting cargo. In reversing an instruction
that the shipowner was not required to keep the vessel free from any
occasional condition, the court said that
if the jury should find that there existed a slippery condition, even
though transitory and immediate, resulting from use of soap in the
loading operation, the jury should determine further whether such
condition rendered the ship unseaworthy and, if so, whether the
plaintiff's injury was attributable to the unseaworthy condition.13
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was hold-
ing, over protestations by the shipowner that the mere presence of
grease on a ladder could not render the vessel unseaworthy, that such
a condition, even if temporary, sufficed to constitute unseaworthiness.14
The innate contradictions of the Mitchell rule, however, soon be-
came apparent. As early as 1960, a district judge was interpreting the
case to mean chat "a seaman is not absolutely entitled to a deck that is
not slippery. He is absolutely entitled to a deck that is not unreasonably
slippery.' 15
Finally, in late 1961, the Second Circuit, in Pinto v. States Marine
Corp.,16 established a rule which in effect reestablished the relevance
of the time-lapse test and suggested that transitory unseaworthiness
was not unseaworthiness at all. The plaintiff in Pinto claimed that he
had slipped on grease on a ladder leading to the engine room. Signifi-
cantly, although plaintiff was a full-fledged seaman, his counsel waived
the negligence count under the Jones Act 17 and went to the jury solely
12 283 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1960).
13 Id. at 486.
14 Calderola v. Cunard S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1960).
15 Colon v. Trinidad Corp., 188 F. Supp. 97, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also Blier v.
United States Lines Co., 286 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961), where
the jury was permitted to decide whether the emergence and temporary continuance of a
slippery or other hazardous condition did or did not leave a vessel "reasonably suitable
for intended service" within the Mitchell test.
16 296 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 843 (1962).
17 Merchant Marine Act, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988, amended and codified, 46 U.S.C. §§ 13
et seq. passim (1964).
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on the basis of unseaworthiness. The trial judge's charge emphasized
the "relative" nature of unseaworthiness, which depends upon the cir-
cumstances drawing the ship's fitness into question. In the instant case,
an important consideration subsisted in the fact that the accident was
on a ladder which provided access to the engine room where the use
of oil and grease was necessary for normal operation. Consequently,
"the mere momentary presence of oil in the area does not in and of it-
self render the vessel unseaworthy."'u In order to establish tmseawor-
thiness, the court noted, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
clear preponderance that the oil or grease which allegedly caused his
fall was allowed to accumulate to such a degree that a condition ren-
dering the ship unseaworthy existed rather than a condition which was
a mere momentary outgrowth of the normal functioning of the engine
room. As the court explained,
it is not required that the vessel have a crew member handy with a
rag to wipe off oil the very minute it is placed in an area. A vessel
does not become unseaworthy by reason of a temporary condition
caused by a transient substance if even so the vessel was as fit for
service as similar vessels in similar service. The essential test is
whether, considering place and circumstances, the area was reason-
ably fit to permit Pinto to perform his tasks with reasonable safety.
Absolute perfection is not required under the doctrine of seawor-
thiness. It requires reasonable fitness for intended use.19
In response to plaintiff's objection that the charge had in effect re-
stored the supposedly discredited time-lapse concept, the Second Cir-
cuit, affirming defendant's verdict, said "[t]he charge seems to be good
sense, and we are not persuaded that Mitchell makes it bad law."20
Furthermore, the court pointed out that a determination indicating
no legal distinction between liability for a temporary condition and li-
ability for a permanent one would not render the condition's duration,
prescribed corrective measures and the possible achievement of contin-
uing safety irrelevant to the issue of compliance by the owner with his
duty to provide "a vessel suitable for her intended service." 21
Although the Second Circuit took particular pains to deny that it
was disregarding Mitchell, Pinto certainly eroded the absoluteness of
that case. Thus, in Nuzzo v. Rederi, A/S Wallenco,22 the district judge,
sitting without a jury, found that the vessel was unseaworthy because
18 296 F.2d at 3.
19 Id. at 4.
20 Id.
21Id. at 6.
22 304 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1962).
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plaintiff had stepped into an empty space in a stow of lumber. There
was not only evidence that the stow was "good" but also evidence that
the "hole" should have been covered, and that it had been uncovered
by plaintiff and one of his fellow workers only a few moments before
the accident. In the absence of a finding that the hole was "at odds with
the usual and customary standards of the calling,"23 and because there
was not sufficient evidence for such a conclusion even if it had been
reached, the Second Circuit reversed with a direction to dismiss. It is
this direction, tantamount to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
in a jury case, that makes Nuzzo such a significant landmark on the
road away from Mitchell. The court was saying not merely that a trier
of fact need not find the vessel unseaworthy for a recently-opened hole
in the stow, but that it could not so find. As the late Judge Charles
Clark pointed out in his dissent, the majority opinion "appears to re-
introduce negligence concepts into the law of unseaworthiness. '24
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Jefferson v. Taiyo
Katun K.K.25 was confronted with a broken-dunnage case in which
the jury had answered special interrogatories somewhat peculiarly,
finding that the plaintiff had been injured by the breaking of the
board, but that the board was not unseaworthy at the time of the acci-
dent. The court, without citing either Mitchell or Pinto, affirmed a
judgment for the shipowner, refusing to hold as a matter of law that
the vessel was unseaworthy. Noting only the rareness of cases "where
the issue of unseaworthiness as the proximate cause of an injury is to
be resolved for or against a shipowner as a matter of law,"2 the court
held that the jury's finding of causality did not require a finding that
the vessel was unseaworthy. In the absence of the evidence, which the
Fifth Circuit specifically refused to recite, it is difficult to assess the
court's conclusion. Conceivably, the board might have broken under
circumstances which rendered the ship reasonably safe; but it is also
possible that the breaking of the dunnage resulted from a temporary
condition during the discharging. The case therefore belongs in the
line of contra-Mitchell holdings.
In Williams v. Arrow Steamship Corp.,27 the libelant slipped and
injured himself on grain or grain dust during a loading operation. The
23 Id. at 510. The internal quote, which in a similar context will become even more
significant later in this paper, see text accompanying note 95 infra, is from Boudoin v.
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 339 (1955).
24 304 F.2d at 512.
25 310 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1962).
26 Id. at 583.
27 218 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Va. 1963).
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evidence was that the loading operation was entirely normal and cus-
tomary and that it could not be carried out without allowing some of
the grain or dust to litter the deck. At the time of the accident the
amount of grain on the deck was no more than the usual amount. Spe-
cifically considering Mitchell, Blier v. United States Lines Co. 28 and
Pinto, the district judge held that "the presence of grain on the deck
of the vessel is not, of itself, unseaworthiness in the eyes of the law. Its
transitory presence alone is irrelevant. '29 The factors leading to this
conclusion were the use of a "proper, customary and normal method '30
in the grain loading process and the impossibility of preventing grain
spillage during the course of the operation. The court disclaimed any
reliance on the length of time the kernels had been on the deck, and
based its decision solely on a finding that the vessel was reasonably fit
for its intended use.
RESURRECnON oF TiME-LAPSE THEoRY
By 1964, the lower courts had apparently reworked Mitchell to
exclude newborn unsafe conditions from the catalogue of unseaworthi-
ness. A district court judge made the point semantically as well as con-
ceptually:
The test to determine unseaworthiness which should be applied to
a transitory condition is the same as that where the condition is
more permanent.... Under all the circumstances, including the
presence of grease only a very short time before the accident, the
size of the deck area in question with alternative grease-free places
to walk, the stationary position of the vessel at a pier, etc., the ves-
sel does not appear to me to have been unseaworthy.31
The Supreme Court has never explicitly reexamined the problem,
or even recognized it, although in 1962, Morales v. Galveston32 pre-
sented an ideal opportunity to rebury the time-lapse theory perma-
nently. Plaintiff, working as a trimmer in a grain hold not equipped
with proper ventilators, suffered fume poisoning when a "shot" of
grain treated with chemicals momentarily filled the hatch square, thus
cutting off the flow of fresh air. Initially, the district court, sitting in
admiralty, found for the ship 33 and the court of appeals affirmed.3 4 The
28 286 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 868 U.S. 836 (1961). See also note 15 supra.
29 218 F. Supp. at 598 (emphasis added).
30 Id.
31 Testa v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 154, 157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(emphasis added).
32 870 U.S. 165 (1962).
33 181 F. Supp. 202 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
31275 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1960).
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Supreme Court vacated and remanded for consideration in light of the
recently decided Mitchell opinion.3 5 Upon remand, the court of ap-
peals held that Mitchell did not apply and again affirmed the district
court.36 On its second trip to the Supreme Court, the issue as deline-
ated by that Court was "whether, upon the facts as found by the Dis-
trict Court, it was error to hold that the Grelmarion was seaworthy at
the time the petitioners were injured."'37 In affirming the holding for
the ship, the Court ruled that the findings below in no way conflicted
with Mitchell, since the cause of the injury in the present case "was not
the ship, its appurtenances, or its crew, but the isolated and completely
unforeseeable introduction of a noxious agent from without."38 The
trial judge having found that the vessel was not unfit for the service in
which it was to be put, the Supreme Court would not "say that his de-
termination was wrong."3 9
It should be noted that the dissenters (Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Douglas and Black) agreed with the majority that the adventi-
tious nature of an accident-cause would be relevant to the issue of sea-
worthiness. "A vessel without a forced ventilation system would be sea-
worthy," Justice Douglas admitted, "if this injury were an unexpected
isolated occurrence." 40 But, he went on to say, the evidence showed
that 10 percent of the grain loaded from the elevator in question was
fumigated. Because the shipowner had knowledge of the presence of
fumes, this particular shot, he argued, rendered the vessel unseaworthy.
One commentator has concluded that the teaching of Morales is
simply that the conclusion of the trier of fact as to unseaworthiness
vel non will not ordinarily be overturned.4 1 But the Court's unani-
mous view that an "isolated occurrence," no matter how dangerous,
would not render the vessel unseaworthy suggests that the Supreme
Court, too, has accepted the idea that a transitory condition may, be-
cause of its very evanescence, not suffice to constitute unseaworthiness.
A feature of the concept of transitory unseaworthiness expressed
in Morales has been the tendency of the courts, when determining
whether or not a condition rendered the vessel something less than rea-
sonably safe, to consider the length of time the accident-causing condi-
tion existed. The judges refuse to restrict their view to the moment
35 364 U.S. 295 (1960).
36291 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1961).
37370 U.S. at 168.
38 Id. at 171.
89 Id.
401d. at 172. See also Dugas v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 578 F.2d 271, 274-75 (5th Cir.
1967).
41 See Note, The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness in the Lower Federal Courts, 76 HDv.
L REv. 819, 827 (1963).
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immediately preceding the accident. Of course, logically, as to that
moment and that particular about-to-be-injured man, the ship is less
than reasonably safe. But the issue is not stated in those terms. Instead,
the courts view the problem statistically; if the condition of the ship,
regarded generally, presents a reasonable chance of any given man's
not being injured, the ship is reasonably safe, and hence seaworthy.
This attitude makes practical sense, but it could be argued that it
makes no statistical sense. After all, if one tosses a penny, the probabil-
ity of "heads" is 50 percent on every toss; even if the first 999 tosses
turn up "tails," the chance of "heads" on toss 1000 is still only 50 per-
cent. Thus it could be said that in determining the reasonable safety
of the vessel as to the plaintiff, the absence of prior accidents is really
immaterial.
INSTANTANEOUS UNSEAWORTHINESS
Closely related to transitory unseaworthiness is a concept vari-
ously labeled instantaneous unseaworthiness or operational negligence.
The question is simple: What obligations will be imposed upon a ship-
owner for injuries to a seaman or quasi-seaman resulting from misuse
of sound equipment?
The first case to analyze the problem thoroughly was Grillea v.
United States.42 There, longshoremen improperly put down a hatch
cover; injury resulted. Writing the opinion which held the vessel un-
seaworthy, Judge Learned Hand noted that however incongruous it
might seem to allow a longshoreman to recover for an unsafe condition
which had been created by himself and his fellow workers, logic did
not prevent the imposition of liability, because "there is a moment,
however short, during which the ship is unfit and during which her
unfitness causes the injury."43 Not every misdeed by the longshoremen
would render the ship unseaworthy, however. Judge Hand distin-
guished between "situations in which the defect is only an incident in
a continuous operation, and those in which some intermediate step is
to be taken as making the ship unseaworthy." 44 The passing of time be-
comes a critical ingredient in the process of transformation. 45
Impact of Mitchell on Operational Negligence
After the Mitchell decision, which seemed to eliminate the time-
lapse issue, the distinction drawn in Grillea was arguably irrelevant.
But early post-Mitchell cases tended away from both Grillea and Mit-
42 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956).
43 Id. at 922.
44 Id.
45 See Tarabocchia v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 297 F. Supp. 878, 883 ($D.N.Y. 1969).
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chell, holding that a vessel is not unseaworthy if the plaintiff's injury
resulted wholly from some cause other than a defect of the ship's gear..
Under this line of cases, even the carelessness of the plaintiff's fellow
longshoremen was insufficient to cast the vessel in unseaworthiness.
The principal opinion of this genre was Arena v. Luckenbach Steam-
ship Co.,48 which involved a longshoreman who was injured when
rolls of paper fell off a pallet. As the court noted, "[t]here was no evi-
dence that any equipment failed, and no one testified, hypothetically
or otherwise, to what caused the upset." 47 In affirming a directed ver-
dict for the defendant, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that the use of improper equipment, in and of itself, does not render a
vessel unseaworthy unless the proper type of equipment is unavailable.
In the case at bar, "[t]he board was not defective simply because the
longshoreman who loaded it neglected to do so in the proper fash-
ion."48
After the decision was handed down, the Supreme Court decided
Mitchell. On petition for rehearing, the First Circuit specifically con-
sidered the Mitchell rationale and explicitly denied its application:
The possible transitory nature of a condition of unseaworthiness
has been accented since our opinion herein.... But we do not be-
lieve that unseaworthiness is to be equated with mere negligent
conduct .... If a winchman employed by a stevedore negligently
lowered a boom onto a longshoreman, it would be true, in a sense,
that the longshoreman had not been working in a safe place. But
absent a showing that the winchman was an unfit individual we
could not say that the vessel was unseaworthy.49
The Grillea-Arena conflict seemed to crystallize as follows. If the
injury occurred because the seaman or his fellow workers were doing
their work improperly, the vessel would not be considered unseawor-
thy; or, put another way, the vessel would be considered reasonably
safe. If, on the other hand, the injury resulted from an unsafe condi-
tion created by the plaintiff or his fellows, the vessel would be held un-
seaworthy. The distinction was participial, the difference between
"doing" and "done." If the seamen were in the process of performing
the task and, because of their carelessness in performing it, plaintiff
was injured, before completion of the carelessly performed task, the
vessel was seaworthy. But if the careless job had been finished and then
the plaintiff suffered injury, the vessel was unseaworthy. This was a
46 279 F.2d 186 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895 (1960).
47 Id. at 187.
48 Id. at 188.
49 Id. at 189.
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distinction "between operational negligence and a condition negli-
gently created," 50 or, as it was sometimes expressed, the difference be-
tween a cause and a condition.
The distinction was easy to state, difficult to define, and, as the
courts promptly realized, almost impossible to apply with logical
consistency. Why, in Tedeschi v. Luckenbach Steamship Co.,5' for ex-
ample, should an open batten well around a hatch, allowed by the long-
shoremen to remain uncovered throughout discharging, constitute "a
condition recognizable as unseaworthiness," 52 while in Nuzzo 3 a hole
in a lumber stow first uncovered during the course of work and permit-
ted to stay that way did not?54 Perhaps the difference was that although
in Tedeschi the batten hatch was uncovered for "an appreciable inter-
val of time,"5 5 the hole in the lumber stow which injured Nuzzo had
been covered "until not more than fifteen minutes before the acci-
dent happened."5 6 If that were the difference, it seemed to conflict
squarely with Mitchell's apparent elimination of the time-lapse inquiry.
Identifying the Negligent Actor
When considering cases involving operational unseaworthiness,
it was and is essential to identify accurately the negligent actor. Cases
in which the operating negligence was that of the injured man himself
tended to blur the principle involved. True, Holley v. The Manfred
Stansfield5 7 established beyond question that the mere fact that the in-
jured party himself had created the unseaworthiness would not, as a
matter of law, bar recovery. However, when deciding cases involving
plaintiff's operational negligence, the courts, particularly trial judges
sitting without juries, frequently confuse the issue. Thus, for example,
in Pisano v. The S.S. Benny Skou, 58 where the injury had resulted from
the longshoreman's own faulty rigging of a preventer wire, the court
found the vessel unseaworthy, but assessed contributory negligence at
100 percent and did not even consider the possibility of applying the
operational unseaworthiness rule.
A somewhat more satisfactory, although still confusing, case is
50 Note, supra note 41, at 828.
51324 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1963).
52 Id. at 630.
53 Nuzzo v. Rederi, A/S Wallenco, 304 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1962).
54 See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra.
55 324 F.2d at 630.
56 304 F.2d at 508.
57 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960).
58 220 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
1970]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Rawson v. Calmar Steamship Corp.59 There, the injured longshoreman
had been in charge of the boom whose cable ran out of control; post-
accident inspection revealed that both safety pins had been removed.
On a finding by the trial court for respondent, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The appellate court was not convinced
by the argument that instantaneous unseaworthiness occurs where the
injury to the longshoreman has resulted from his own negligent act-
although a different outcome might be reached where a non-actor is in-
volved. "We would think unseaworthiness implies an antecedent con-
dition, although it is quite apparent that the pre-existence of the
condition may be very short. . . . Surely there must be some interval,
tvo acts and not the same one."60
A perfect example of this fusing of separate concepts of opera-
tional negligence and 100 percent contributory negligence appeared
in Seitz v. The Captantonis,61 where a longshoreman fell from a ladder
because he had improperly adjusted a turnbuckle. Admittedly, the mal-
adjustment had rendered the turnbuckle unsafe. Nonetheless, the court
exonerated the ship. From its language, however, one cannot tell
whether the basis for denying recovery was the plaintiff's "negligence
of a high degree" or that the "warranty of seaworthiness does not en-
compass the negligent use by a longshoreman of seaworthy appliances."
It was the act of libelant in turning the barrel [of the turnbuckle]
in the wrong direction which caused the separation and his result-
ing injuries. The large expanse of exposed thread outside of the
barrel which libelant failed to observe could have been observed
by a reasonably prudent person. To conduct an experiment on
which way to turn the barrel under such circumstances constituted
negligence of a high degree. I find that such actions on the part of
libelant were the proximate cause of his fall and resulting injuries.
The shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness does not encompass the
negligent use by a longshoreman of seaworthy appliances.6 2
SWITCHING ONUS TO GEAR OR CARGO
The opinions best illuminating the extent to which negligent use
of sound equipment constitutes unseaworthiness are those in which the
negligence involved is that of someone other than the injured plaintiff.
The decisions in the first few years after Mitchell tended to follow that
case's emphasis on the material condition of the vessel.63 If the ship-
50 304 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962).
60 Id. at 205.
61203 F. Supp. 723 (D. Ore. 1962).
62 Id. at 727.
63 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
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owner's warranty of seaworthiness required him "only to furnish a ves-
sel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use, '64 then
once the evidence established that the ship's gear was in fact reasonably
fit, the vessel was seaworthy, even if a seaman sustained injury because
of negligent use of that gear,65 or its employment in a service for which
it was not intended. 6 Moreover, courts which focused on the soundness
of the ship's gear as the measure of the shipowner's fulfillment of his
-arranty found it easy to conclude that a seaman injured because of a
defect in the cargo which he was loading could not attribute unsea-
worthiness to a vessel which was in every other respect sound and fit. 7
On the other hand, if the plaintiff were injured while discharging
cargo, either because of a defect in the cargo, or an imperfection in the
stowage, recovery for unseaworthiness was permitted. Cargo which is
being discharged has, after all, been aboard the vessel since she left the
loading port. Courts could much more easily consider stowed cargo a
part of the vessel's "appurtenances" within the Mitchell test. 8
In another sense, the loading-discharging distinction mirrored the
cause-condition dichotomy of Grillea and Arena.6 9 Incoming cargo
which by its nature was injurious or which could produce injury be-
cause of the improper way in which it had been stowed was, in a sense,
negligence come to rest; defective cargo coming aboard, or sound cargo
in the process of being stowed incorrectly, could, in the light of these
cases, be regarded as negligence which had not yet crystallized suffi-
ciently to create the dangerous shipboard condition.
Mitchell's emphasis on material as the sole relevant subject of in-
quiry and the resulting relative simplicity of drawing lines made the
loaded-loading distinction attractive. Of course, from the plaintiff's
viewpoint it made no difference that his injury had resulted from cargo
improperly stowed at the last port rather than from cargo which his
fellow workers were improperly stowing. An equally relevant question
might arise if longshoremen loading a vessel began to stow cargo in
such a manner as to leave the stow so unsafe that when they resumed
work part of it fell and injured one of them.
As early as 1961, the Third Circuit suggested the trend of subse-
quent developments, as well as the inherent weakness of the distinc-
64 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. at 550.
65 See Massa v. C.A. Venezuelan Navigacion, 332 F.2d 779, 781 (2d Cir. 1964).
66 See Spinelli v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 1963 A.M.C. 1814, 1821 (8.D.N.Y.), affd, 326 F.2d
870 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
67 See Carabellese v. Naviera Aznar, SA, 285 F.2d 355, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1960); see also
Annat., 90 A.L.R.2d 710 (1960).
68 See, e.g., Hill v. American President Lines, 194 F. Supp. 885, 889 (E.D. Va. 1961).
69 See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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tion, in Knox v. United States Lines Co.,70 holding that it was up to the
trier of fact to determine whether the status of the stow just before the
injury "constituted an unseaworthy condition." 71 On retrial, the evi-
dence showed that it was not the unsafe stow, but rather the method
by which the longshoreman had dealt with it that caused the injury;
the trial judge, hearing the case jury-waived, found for the defendant;
the court of appeals, applying the not-clearly-erroneous test of McAllis-
ter v. United States,72 affirmed the judgment.73
As the Third Circuit subsequently remarked,
[u]nless a valid distinction can be drawn between a stevedore's un-
safe breaking-down of a seaworthy stowage and its negligent (un-
safe) use of a ship's equipment, a logical projection of our holding
in Knox would seem to indicate our subscription to the view that
a stevedore's negligent or unsafe use of a ship's seaworthy equip-
ment makes the ship unseaworthy.74
A few months earlier, the Fourth Circuit had handed down Scott v.
Isbrandtsen Co.,7 5 a decision explicitly rejecting a test utilized in nu-
merous courts for many years-i.e., "mere operational negligence on
the part of longshoremen resulting in injury to one of them will not
create liability on the part of the shipowner" 70-and held that the trial
court should have charged the jury that the longshoremen could render
the vessel unseaworthy. The court did not even consider, much less at-
tempt to reconcile, the difference between "condition" and "cause,"
between "done" and "doing." Unfortunately, it further clouded the
holding by noting the shipowner's right, in longshoring situations, to
obtain indemnity from the stevedore, 77 which, of course, is no rationale
whatsoever for the resolution of the unseaworthiness issue.
The Third Circuit shortly thereafter, in Thompson v. Calmar
Steamship Corp.,78 adopted the position that unseaworthiness could
comport with sound ship's equipment if the equipment (the winch and
a line) were used in connection with other sound equipment (freight
cars on the pier) in a "dangerous" manner.7 9 "There is no insulation
from unseaworthiness of the ship's line and its attachments merely be-
70 294 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1961).
71ld. at 358.
72348 U.S. 19 (1954).
7320 F.2d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 1968).
74 Ferrante v. Swedish Am. Lines, 331 F.2d 571, 577 (Sd Cir. 1964).
75 827 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1964).
76 Id. at 127.
77 Id. at 127-28.
78 831 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 US. 913 (1964).
79 Id. at 660.
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cause the attachments were not in themselves defective if used in some
other manner."80
It is worth noting that the court did not explicitly hold opera-
tional negligence to constitute unseaworthiness. As Judges Hastie and
Smith pointed out in their dissent from the denial of the petition for
rehearing, although the stevedores may have been guilty of active neg-
ligence, there was no structural or operational defect in the gear. More-
over, there was no unfitness which would prevent the movement of
cargo-carrying cars. "If a ship is to be liable for any negligence of the
stevedore or any other third person in misusing its gear, I think the
courts should say so.""1 Further evidence of the Third Circuit's uncer-
tainty will appear later in this paper.8 2
The Ninth Circuit, meanwhile, was still trying to draw meaning-
ful distinctions. Blassingill v. Waterman Steamship Corp. 3 presented
a simple issue: "Putting two bales in the sling was a safe method of un-
loading them. Putting four bales in the sling was not. 8s4 The long-
shoreman was injured during the unloading process and the trial court
charged in terms of soundness of the vessel's equipment. "The case is
really not one of defective equipment, but of an improper method of
using it,""" said the court of appeals, and remanded for a new trial, in-
sisting that this was not a case of "instant unseaworthiness."
Thus, Blassingill might fal in this case if the only danger was
brought about by himself or his fellow longshoremen in not prop-
erly placing bales in the particular slingload that injured him. The
evidence, however, does not require a finding that that is what hap-
pened.86
But at about the same tinme, the Ninth Circuit was deciding Beeler
v. Alaska Aggregate Corp.87 There, plaintiff was injured when his fel-
low workers negligently failed to hold the ladder which he was trying
to descend. The trial court found that the negligence occurred simul-
taneously with the accident and injury, and entered judgment for the
defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that "[l]iability on the
ground of unseaworthiness does not attach if the injury was sustained
by the negligent use of a seaworthy appliance at the very moment of
8O ld.
81 Id. at 663.
82 See note 93 and accompanying text infra.
83 336 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1964).
84 Id. at 369.
85 Id. at 370.
86 Id. (emphasis added).
87 336 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1964).
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injury."88 Aside from the fact that the holding assumes its conclusion,89
Beeler fails logically to reconcile with Blassingill. In Blassingill, sound
gear was negligently overloaded, and the plaintiff was injured; in
Beeler the injury resulted from negligent failure to hold an otherwise
sound ladder. Both conditions seem equally "unsafe."
THE MASCUILLI ENLIGHTENMENT
With the various circuits searching for some rational approach to
the problem of operational negligence, the litigation in Mascuilli v.
United States90 began to develop. Mascuilli involved a claim for death
caused when careless use of admittedly sound ship's cargo-lifting equip-
ment caused a wire to part, killing one of the longshoremen. The trial
judge's findings were unusual; he found specifically that the ship's gear
was sound, and that "the accident was caused solely by the negligent
operation of the stevedoring crew,"9 1 but he also made the following
conclusion of law: "The longshoremen crew was not 'equal in disposi-
tion and seamanship to the ordinary men in the calling' at the time the
ninth tank [which was on the gear at the time it failed] was being
loaded."9 2 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in a
one-paragraph opinion emphasizing the findings of fact (1) that the ves-
sel and its equipment were at all times seaworthy and (2) that "the acci-
dent was caused solely by the negligent operation of the stevedoring
crew." These findings were found to be "not dearly erroneous."
93
Observe that the trial court could be said to have based its exoner-
ation of the ship not merely upon the soundness of the vessel's equip-
ment, but also upon the conclusion that the longshoremen's negligent
use of sound equipment was so egregious-as to brand the workers hope-
less incompetents-i.e., the longshoremen were so unskillful as to be
unequal to "the ordina-y man in the calling." 94 The concept is taken
from assault cases in which vessels were held unseaworthy because the
assaulting crew member was held to be more vicious than the "ordinary
man in the calling." 95
This point is emphasized because it seems crucial to an under-
88 Id. at 109.
89 Is not an unheld ladder at least arguably not "a seaworthy appliance"? See Reid v.
Quebec Paper Sales & Transp. Co., 340 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1965).
90241 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 358 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd per
curiam, 387 US. 237 (1967).
91241 F. Supp. at 362 (finding of fact 35).
92 Id. at 364 (conclusion of law 17).
93 358 F.2d at 133.
94 241 F. Supp. at 364.
95 See Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
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standing of what the subsequent history of the Mascuilli litigation
means. Following the Third Ciricuit opinion, the plaintiff petitioned
for certiorari. In a single sentence the Supreme Court disposed of the
entire matter: "The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the
judgment is reversed."90 Only two cases were cited in support of the
opinion. The first, Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co.,97 has generally
been thought to stand for the principle that if unsound gear and sound
gear are available on the vessel, but the plaintiff is injured by the use
of the unsound gear, the availability of the sound gear does not save the
vessel from being unseaworthy. The second case, Crumady v. The Jo-
achim Hendrik Fisser,98 held a vessel unseaworthy because the long-
shoremen had failed to reset an improperly set cutoff on an electric
winch, so that the winch was allowed to operate beyond the safe work-
ing load of the gear, thus causing an accident. In short, the principle
to be gleaned from Crumady is that gear which is not inherently defec-
tive but is potentially defective-i.e., it can be adjusted in such a man-
ner as to make it "unsafe and dangerous for the work at hand"-
renders the ship unseaworthy.99
COMMENTARY AND CONCLUSION
The pitifully inadequate Mascuilli opinion left the circuits in con-
fusion. Early subsequent holdings seem to indicate a feeling by the
circuit judges that the Supreme Court had affirmatively answered the
question: "Can a ship be rendered unseaworthy solely on account of
the negligence of a longshoreman during a loading operation?"'100
Later opinions were far less certain.10'
Reading the "ordinary man in the calling" standard, which the
district court in Mascuilli applied, together with the cases cited by the
Supreme Court, it becomes reasonably clear that the holding is simply
this: longshoremen can turn safe gear into unsafe gear by failing to
make necessary mechanical adjustments; their incompetence renders
the vessel unseaworthy; the fact that the gear could have been made
safe and that the longshoremen could have refrained from misaligning
96587 U.S. 237 (1967).
97 521 U.S. 96 (1944).
98358 U.S. 423 (1959).
99 Id. at 427.
100Alexander v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 382 F.2d 963, 964 (2d Cir. 1967); see also
Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1968); Candiano
v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1967).
101 See, e.g., Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv., 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969); Tim v.
American President Lines, 409 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1969); see also cases collected in
Lundy v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 423 F.2d 913, 914 (4th Cir. 1970); J. LvcAs, ADM ILTY 998
(1969).
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it is as irrelevant as the presence of the unused sound gear in Mah-
nich.0 2
In short, whatever the Supreme Court might have said in its reso-
lution of the problem presented by Mascuilli, in fact, it did not say
anything new. It has been suggested that the Mascuilli facts were so
close to those of Crumady that possibly the Court's summary reversal
was based upon the belief that Crumady controlled on the facts, and
that the Court intended to express no opinion on the Grillea issue, i.e.,
on the condition-cause dichotomy.10 3 Thus Mascuilli has not really
helped to answer the question implicit in Mitchell: If the shipowner
supplies "a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended
use," but through careless ongoing use (as opposed to careless or delib-
erate conversion of safe equipment into unsafe equipment, as by failing
to set the proper cutoff) a longshoreman is injured, has the shipowner
furnished a place reasonably safe to work? Some courts have indicated
that a plan of operation that is inherently unsafe will, if carried out
with a resulting injury, cast the vessel in unseaworthiness, while a
proper plan, carelessly executed and injuring the plaintiff, will not. 04
This seems, however, to be reintroducing the prohibited foreseeability
concept. On the other hand, perhaps the formula of reasonable-fitness-
for-intended-use automatically installs the foreseeability issue in any
question of unseaworthiness. 10 5
Consider two hypothetical cases: (1) If a longshoreman carelessly
drops a perfectly sound block on another longshoreman's head, should
the vessel be liable? (2) If a longshoreman trying to push a piece of
cargo too heavy for him to move by himself loses control and drops the
cargo upon another longshoreman's foot, can it be said that the acci-
dent resulted from an insufficiency of men, and that the vessel is thus
unseaworthy? In an analogous situation, the Supreme Court answered
the latter question affirmatively. 10 6 Considering the cases in terms of
ship's equipment (including men as "appurtenances"), it seems reason-
able to distinguish between the two accidents. In the first, nothing at
all pertaining to the ship was amiss. In the second, the single longshore-
102 321 U.S. at 103.
103 See Note, Unseaworthiness, Operational Negligence, and the Death of the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 43 No=E DAME LAW. 550, 564 (1968).
104 See, e.g., Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 864 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1966); Cleary v.
United States Lines Co., 287 F. Supp. 601, 603 ($.D.N.Y. 1967).
105 See Note, The Law of Unseaworthiness and the Doctrine of Instant Unseaworthi-
ness, 28 MD. L. REv. 249, 275 (1968); Comment, The Warranty of Seaworthiness: An Ap-
praisal of Longshoremen's Remedies for On-the-job Injuries, 42 N.Y.U.L. Ra,. 31, 347
(1967).
100 See Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 886 U.S. 724 (1967).
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man was, by his solitude, in effect "gear" which was not reasonably,
fit for its intended use. He was, in fact, "gear" supplied by the steve-
dore; but for failure of equipment thus supplied, the ship is liable. 07
Of course as to the injured men, any distinction vanishes. Both are in-
jured through carelessness of fellow workers. "[E]very act of negli-
gence, no matter how short-lived, creates an unsafe condition for those
exposed to it."108
This plaintiff-oriented analysis may be useful in suggesting a way
out of the dilemma eloquently outlined by Judge Moore of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a petition for rehearing in Candi-
ano v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.0 9 It may also render unnecessary
the approach proposed by Judge Heebe in Jackson v. S.S. Kings
Point. 110 He suggested that the true reading of Mascuilli is "that unsea-
worthiness will be presumed to exist whenever there is any question at
all as to whether or not a 'condition' caused the longshoreman's inju-
ries. . . .Recovery by the longshoreman may be denied only when it
is crystal clear that a negligent act caused his injuries.""' Judge Heebe,
in other words, would resolve the problem by restating it in terms of
proof-quanta or burden of persuasion." 2 The way out of the thicket is,
like most such escape routes, clear but difficult to traverse unscratched.
In order to achieve it, one must recognize a principle which the courts
have been avoiding ever since the "humanitarian" principle of sea-
worthiness was floated into the law." 3 The idea of allowing a longshore-
man to recover for unseaworthiness, followed to its logical conclusion
in light of the divorce of unseaworthiness from concepts of negligence,
foreseeability, and control, is that when a man is injured aboard ship
through some other efficient cause than his own carelessness, the ship-
owner should bear the cost of the injury as a part of his cost of doing
business. The area of factual inquiry should be the plaintiff's "work
environment.""14
This is not to say that every accident on board a vessel should be
automatic grounds for recovery by the plaintiff. The jury should be in-
structed that the shipowner is not liable for every accident which oc-
107 See Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 847 US. 396 (1954).
108 Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Transp. Co., 340 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1965).
109 386 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1967).
110 276 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. La. 1967).
Ill Id. at 453.
112 See also Comment, The Doctrine of Unseaworthiness in the Law of Maritime
Personal Injuries, 21 LA. L. Rxv. 755, 765 (1961), wherein the author suggests that the
shipowner, by proving adherence to industry standards, could raise a rebuttable inference
of seaworthiness.
313 See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 US. 85 (1946).
114 See Comment, supra note 105, at 342-48.
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curs; he is liable only for those resulting from what the jury may find
to be a lack of reasonable safety. In other words, between reasonable
safety and absolute safety lies a thin zone of danger. Accidents occur-
ring in that zone are not subject to recovery. Moreover, the jury should
further be instructed that it is to consider the question of reasonable
safety from the viewpoint of the plaintiff. As to the plaintiff, was the
deck on which he was walking reasonably safe? From the plaintiff's
viewpoint, was the operation in which his fellow longshoremen were
carelessly engaged reasonably safe?115
In reply to the objection that this analysis inevitably must bring
back concepts of foreseeability and time, it is submitted that the Su-
preme Court itself has condoned this heresy (if heresy it be). If the
finder of fact in Morales was entitled, as even the dissenters agreed, to
consider the previous statistics of poisonous grain "shots," then the
juries in other cases are certainly capable of determining whether the
amount of grease on the deck and the period of time it lay there made
the deck something less than reasonably safe for the plaintiff, and
whether the longshoremen's mode of operation made the working area
similarly unsafe for the plaintiff. The trial judges and juries will not
have to engage in the impossible calculus so vividly spelled out by
Judge Moore: "Is 'operational negligence' to be mentioned at all?
When does the 'operation' commence? How momentary is a 'momen-
tary interval'? Is 'instant negligence' to be added to instant unseawor-
thiness?"" 6
Although the same judge feared that "the very finding of oper-
ational negligence is a simultaneous finding of unseaworthiness [since
t]he alchemy is instantaneous,""17 in fact the distinction is still present.
If on the facts the jury decides that the place of work was, as to the
plaintiff, reasonably safe, there will be no recovery. Putting the ques-
tion to the jury in those terms, and allowing the jurors to consider the
circumstances in the light of their own common sense should effec-
tively "scuttle a doctrine which requires judges to make distasteful
hairsplitting distinctions unrelated to any intelligible concepts of right
and wrong," and rest liability "on something more than casuistry,""' 8
namely, the jury's evaluation of the work-space provided to the plain-
tiff.
115 This approach was adumbrated in Rodriguez v. Coastal Ship Corp., 310 F. Supp.
38, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
116 Candiano v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 F.2d at 448.
117 Id. at 449.
118 Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 360 F.2d 539, 544 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting).
